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We hypothesize that firms structure their asset holdings so as to shelter assets from 
extraction by politicians and bureaucrats.  In countries where the threat of political 
extraction is higher, we hypothesize that firms hold a lower fraction of their assets in 
liquid form.  Consistent with this conjecture, using data for over 30,000 firms across 109 
countries, we find that corporate holdings of liquid assets are negatively correlated with 
measures of political corruption.  Further, annual investment in property, plant, 
equipment, and inventory plus dividends is positively correlated with measures of 
political corruption suggesting that owners channel their cash into harder to extract 
assets.  To the extent that the threat of political extraction moves firms away from their 
otherwise optimal levels of liquid assets, our findings suggest that the threat of political 
extraction may reduce economic development not only through the direct costs of 
political payoffs, but also because the potential for asset extraction moves firms away 
from their otherwise optimal asset holdings.   
 
 Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction 
1. Introduction 
  Governments, or more accurately, politicians and bureaucrats extract resources 
from firms.  That phenomenon is well recognized and easily documented.  The extraction 
of resources can be in relatively benign and transparent forms such as the collection of 
usage fees or taxes on reported income.  It can also be harsh and punitive such as the 
nationalization of firms or even entire industries.  In between these arguably two 
extremes lies the gray area of petty harassment and extortion.   
Presumably, however, firms and their owners also take steps to avoid or minimize 
such asset extraction.  Indeed, they may structure their asset holdings in ways that make 
extraction by politicians and bureaucrats difficult or costly.  To the extent that owners do 
organize their firms’ asset holdings to minimize political extraction, the impact is most 
likely to show up in countries in which the threat of extraction is highest.  Further, to the 
extent that the structuring of corporate assets is sensitive to the likelihood of political 
extraction, it is most likely to show up in the holdings of liquid assets for, as Myers and 
Rajan (1998) observe, “[a]nonymous, transportable assets, such as cash, bearer bonds, or 
commodities, are easier to steal than fixed assets…”
1    
With these underpinnings in mind, and using a sample of over 30,000 publicly 
traded firms from 109 countries, this paper examines empirically whether corporate 
holdings of liquid assets are correlated with measures of the likelihood of political 
extraction across countries.  The primary hypothesis is that corporate holdings of cash 
and marketable securities are negatively correlated with the likelihood of political 
                                                 
1 Myers and Rajan (1998), p. 736. 
 extraction.  Our presumption is that cash and marketable securities are the assets most 
easily converted to private benefits and, thus, most likely to be the target of political 
extraction which, in turn, means they are most in need of sheltering.  We consider four 
measures of the likelihood of political extraction.   
After controlling for firm-specific characteristics and for country-wide factors 
identified by prior research as determinants of cash holdings, we find that the ratio of 
cash plus marketable securities (henceforth, cash) to total assets is significantly 
negatively correlated with each of the measures of the likelihood of political extraction.  
This relation is robust to whether we conduct the analysis using firms as the unit of 
observation or whether we aggregate across firms within each country and use the 
country as the unit of observation.  The effect is also economically significant: depending 
upon the empirical specification considered, an increase in the likelihood of political 
extraction of one standard deviation (from the mean) results in a reduction in the ratio of 
cash to total assets that ranges from 7.0% to 19.5%.   
These results immediately give rise to the question of - - what happens to the 
cash? That is, after controlling for other factors, if cash holdings are lower, the cash must 
be deployed elsewhere.  One possibility is that the funds have been invested in “hard” 
assets and/or used to pay higher dividends.  To investigate this possibility, we examine 
the ratio of the annual investment in property, plant, equipment, and inventory plus 
dividends to sales.  We find a positive correlation between this ratio and our various 
measures of the likelihood of political extraction.  Thus, a higher potential for political 
extraction is associated with a higher level of investment in harder to extract assets and/or 
a higher level of payouts to shareholders.  This result demonstrates that cash holdings are 
2 lower because firms, or more accurately, their owners, have made an affirmative decision 
to utilize their funds in ways that shelter them, at least in part, from political extraction.   
Note that our findings do not mean that when searching the globe for places to 
locate their hard asset investments firms and their owners search for countries in which 
the likelihood of political extraction is highest.  Rather, they imply that, given that a firm 
is domiciled in a country in which the risk of political extraction is greater, the firm will 
invest relatively more in hard assets (and/or pay out more to shareholders) than if the firm 
were located in a country in which the risk of political extraction is lower.  In this regard, 
our work is connected to studies reporting that multinational firms base their decisions 
regarding the geographic location of their assets and operations, at least in part, on 
perceived differences in the necessity to pay bribes across countries (Fan, Morck, Xu and 
Yeung (2007), Smarzynska and Wei (2000), Wheeler and Mody (1992)).  These studies 
suggest that the potential for political extraction plays a role when owners consider the 
structure of assets across countries.  These studies further suggest that the potential for 
political extraction may retard economic development because firms and their owners are 
less likely to invest in countries in which political corruption is higher.   
Our results indicate that the potential for political extraction also plays a role in 
the way in which resident owners structure their firms’ assets within countries.  To the 
extent that asset sheltering of all kinds (including liquid assets) moves firms away from 
their otherwise optimal asset structure, and to the extent that such deviations retard 
development, our results suggest that corruption may retard economic development not 
only because of the direct costs of political payoffs, but also because of the indirect costs 
associated with asset structuring that deviates from the otherwise optimal structure.  To 
3 be more precise, in politically corrupt countries, firms appear to operate with what is an 
otherwise less than optimal level of liquid assets. 
Our paper relates to two sets of literature - - the literature on the effect of political 
corruption on corporate behavior and the literature on the determinants of corporate 
holdings of liquid assets.  We briefly review these literatures in Section 2.  Section 3 
describes the data.  Section 4 presents the results of regressions of cash against the 
measures of the likelihood of political extraction.  Section 5 presents the results of 
regressions of annual investment in property, plant, equipment, and inventory plus 
dividends against the measures of political extraction.  Section 6 presents the results of 
various robustness tests.  Section 7 concludes. 
2. Prior  studies 
  The extraction of corporate assets by politicians and government bureaucrats can 
be classified under the generic rubric of political corruption.  The modern literature on 
this topic is customarily traced to Rose-Ackerman (1975).  She analyzes three situations 
in which politicians extract bribes from firms seeking to obtain government contracts.  
From that point, the literature has evolved along both theoretical and empirical fronts and 
has expanded to encompass both micro- and macroeconomic phenomena.  The common 
thread being that the firm is the economic unit analyzed.  An incomplete list of 
contributions to this literature includes Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) who study the effect of corruption on market structure, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
and Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2003) who examine the interactions among firms and 
politicians in which firms both react to and help shape the political environment in which 
they operate, Mauro (1995) and Mo (2001) who examine the link between corruption and 
4 economic growth, Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000), Johnson, 
Kaufmann, McMillan and Woodruff (2000), and Choi and Thum (2005) who examine the 
link between corruption and the size of a country’s “underground” economy.  Survey 
papers on these streams of research include Bardhan (1997) and Graf Lambsdorff (2006).   
  A theoretical antecedent for our study is found in Stulz (2005) who develops a 
model with three participants: politicians, corporate insiders, and minority outside 
shareholders.  Among other observations and predictions, Stulz posits that 
  Corporate insiders can take actions to reduce the state’s proceeds from 
expropriation … In a country with high risk of expropriation, corporate 
insiders may choose to invest in projects that would be negative net 
present value projects in a country where the risk of expropriation is trivial 




In Stulz’ model, owners have the greatest incentive to structure their firm’s asset holdings 
so as to reduce the likelihood that the “state” will extract them in countries in which the 
likelihood of extraction is greatest.  We borrow from Myers and Rajan (1998) and 
extrapolate from Stulz’ idea.  As we noted above, Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that 
anonymous liquid assets are more vulnerable to extraction because they are more difficult 
to trace and are easier and less costly to convert to private consumption.   
If we accept the premise that owners have an incentive to structure their firm’s 
assets in ways that reduce the likelihood of extraction by politicians and state bureaucrats 
and if we accept the premise that liquid assets are more likely to be extracted than are 
hard assets (i.e., property, plant, equipment, and inventory), it follows that owners are 
likely to reduce their holdings of liquid assets relative to other assets so as to reduce the 
likelihood of political extraction.  This is not to say that government officials and 
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5 politicians cannot or do not extract illiquid (or “hard”) assets.  Indeed, in some instances 
the “state” has nationalized entire industries.  Our point is that liquid assets are easier to 
convert to private consumption than are hard assets.  Thus, for example, a bureaucrat 
would rather have cash than a ton of cotton or would even prefer cash to a new Mercedes.   
Further, if we assume that the threat of political extraction varies across countries, 
holding all else constant, it follows that firms will hold relatively fewer liquid assets in 
countries where the threat of political extraction is greatest.   
The reasoning above leads to the primary hypothesis to be tested: Across 
countries, corporate holdings of liquid assets will be negatively correlated with the 
likelihood of extraction by politicians and government bureaucrats.   
Implicit within the reasoning leading to this empirical prediction are two further 
assumptions.  The first is that politicians adjust their demands for bribes according to 
firms’ abilities to pay.  Logic dictates that they do, but there is also empirical support for 
this presumption.  Using survey data from Uganda, Svensson (2003) concludes that 
“…the more a firm can pay; … the more it must pay…”
3  
The second implicit assumption is that there is an optimal level of cash holdings 
at which firms operate in the absence of political extraction so that, holding all else 
constant, deviations from that optimum can be attributed to the potential for political 
extraction.  The theoretical literature on optimal cash holdings is usually traced to Miller 
and Orr (1966) who develop an inventory model of cash management in which the 
optimal level of cash holdings involves a trade-off between the cost of a cash “stock-out” 
                                                 
3 Svensson (2003), p. 10. Supporting evidence is presented by Clarke and Xu (2003) for 
21 transition economies in eastern Europe and central Asia. 
6 and the cost of holding non-interest bearing cash.
4  Empirical support for the trade-off 
models comes from Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999), Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith and Servaes (2003), and Kalcheva and Lins (2007).  For our purposes, the 
importance of the empirical studies is two-fold.  First, they provide support for the notion 
that firms have an optimal level of cash holdings.  Second, they guide our choice of firm- 
and country-level control variables in our regression analysis.   
3. Data   
  Our primary empirical tests are based on cross-sectional regressions for the year 
2005 encompassing the 109 countries listed in table 1.  (As we discuss later, the results 
for 2005 obtain for the years 2002-2004 and 2006, albeit with slightly fewer observations 
in each of those years relative to 2005.)  Our measure of cash plus marketable securities 
and other financial statement data, including ownership of shares by the firm’s largest 
shareholder, are from Orbis, a database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk.  We use four 
indices to proxy for the relative likelihood of political extraction across countries.  The 
first is from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007).  The second and third are from the 
International Country Risk Guide (IRCG) compiled by the Political Risk Services 
Group.
5 The fourth is from Neumann (1994).  Our primary measure of minority 
shareholder protection is the country’s legal origin from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1999) and from the CIA’s World Factbook.
6  Our measure of 
private credit is from Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics, and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000).   
                                                 
4 Extensions to this literature include Eppen and Fama (1968, 1969), Constantinides 
(1976, 1978), Myers (1977) and Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998).  
5 http://www.prsgroup.com.  
6 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.  
7 To be included in our analysis, a firm must be a non-financial publicly traded 
company with available cash, marketable securities, and total assets data in Orbis, and at 
least one of the four proxies for the likelihood of political extraction must be available for 
its home country.  Each country listed in table 1 has at least one firm that meets these 
criteria and every firm that meets these criteria is included in the sample.   
Our primary dependent variable is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities 
(henceforth cash) to total assets.  Our primary independent variable is the likelihood of 
political extraction.  To capture this likelihood we use four indices. 
The first index, which we label “KKM Corruption,” is 
…[T]he extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption…
7 
 
This measure, developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007), is compiled from 
several data sources including non-governmental organizations, commercial business 
providers, surveys, and expert assessments.  Data from those sources are aggregated into 
a combined indicator as a weighted average of the underlying data.  Relative to our other 
indices, this measure has several virtues: (1) it is available for the largest set of countries, 
109; (2) to the extent that the data sources used to compile the index are independent, it is 
likely to have smaller measurement error; (3) it is updated annually.  The shortcomings 
are that (1) it is a relatively new index and, as such, it has not yet been validated by use in 
other studies and (2) the respondents/experts are not from a common pool. 
The second index, which we label “ICRG Corruption,” is  
…[A]n assessment of corruption within the political system.  … The most 
common form of corruption met directly by business is financial 
corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes ....
8   
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8  
The third index, which we label “ICRG Investment profile,” is  
 
...[A]n assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are not 
covered by other political, economic and financial risk components.…The 




The second and third indices are constructed based on the opinion of global experts and 
analysts.  The virtues of these indices are that (1) they measure distinct aspects of the 
likelihood of political extraction and are both developed by the Political Risk Services 
Group; (2) they are updated annually; (3) they have been widely used in prior studies; 
and (4) they are available for a large set of countries, 97.  Their shortcomings are that (1) 
the experts providing the assessments are not from a common pool and (2) the procedure 
used to compile the indices is less transparent than that of the other indices. 
The fourth index, which we label “Neumann Corruption,” was developed by 
Neumann (1994) and is constructed from interviews with German business people whose 
businesses involve exporting to foreign countries.  In spirit, the index attempts to measure 
the frequency with which side payments to government officials are expected in order to 
do business in a given country.  Relative to the other indices, the virtues of this index are 
(1) the respondents are from a common pool and (2) at the time the index was compiled, 
bribery of foreign officials was legal in Germany and, thus, the people interviewed had 
no particular motive to conceal their payments.  The shortcomings of this index are (1) it 
is available only for 1994 and (2) it is available for fewer countries than the others, 78. 
In their raw form, three of the measures of the likelihood of political extraction 
(KKM Corruption, ICRG Corruption, ICRG Investment profile) are scaled so that higher 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.  
9 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx. 
9 values denote a lower likelihood of political extraction.  We invert the original scaling so 
that higher values denote a greater likelihood of political extraction.  In discussions that 
follow, we refer to the four indices collectively as the “corruption indices.” 
We also include the following control variables that previous papers have found 
to be significant in tests of the trade-off theory of cash holdings (Opler et al.  (1999), 
Dittmar et al.  (2003), and Kalcheva and Lins (2007)).  Sales growth (“Sales growth”) is 
measured as the change in sales between year t-1 and year t over sales in year t-1.  The 
ratio of debt to total assets (“Debt/Total assets”) is measured as the sum of long and short 
term debt at the end of year t divided by total assets at the end of year t.  The ratio of cash 
flow to total assets (“Cash flow/Total assets”) is the sum of the earnings after tax plus 
depreciation in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t.  The ratio of change in 
net working capital over total assets (“Delta NWC/Total assets”) is the change in 
accounts receivable between year t-1 and year t minus the change in accounts payable 
between year t-1 and year t divided by total assets at the end of year t.   
The ratio of investments to total assets (“Investments/Total assets”) is net capital 
expenditures in year t plus the change in the inventory between year t-1 and year t plus 
dividends paid during year t divided by total assets at the end of year t.
10 Size (“Ln(Total 
assets)”) is the natural log of total assets at the end of year t measured in millions of U.S.  
dollars.  “Largest shareholder” is the fraction of shares owned by the largest shareholder.  
“UK legal origin” is an indicator variable to identify whether the legal origin of the 
country in which the firm is headquartered is common law.  Finally, the ratio of private 
                                                 
10 We estimate this variable as [–Cash(t) + Cash(t-1) + Cash flow(t) + Debt(t) – Debt(t-1) – 
Non cash operating net working capital(t) + Non cash operating net working capital(t-1) + 
Inventory(t) – Inventory(t-1)] / Total assets(t). 
10 credit to GDP (“Private credit/GDP”) is the amount of credit provided to non-government 
owned entities by banks and other financial institutions divided by GDP.
11  
Any observations for which Cash/Total assets, Largest shareholder, Debt/Total 
assets, Accounts receivable/Total assets, Accounts payable/Total assets, or 
Inventory/Total assets are less than 0 or greater than 1 must be errors and are, therefore, 
excluded.  To limit the effect of data errors in the variables Sales growth, Cash flow/Total 
assets, and Ln(Total assets), which are not naturally bounded between 0 and 1, we 
exclude the top and bottom 1% of the observations. 
  Table 1 lists the countries for which we have data on Cash/Total assets and at 
least one of the corruption variables.  It also gives the number of firms for each country in 
our initial regression (these range from one firm in 10 countries to 5,181 firms in the 
U.S.) along with the average of the ratios of cash to total assets for all firms in a country 
(which range from 0.011 in Uruguay to 0.334 in the Virgin Islands).   
In our regressions, the corruption indices and other variables are standardized to 
facilitate economic interpretation of the coefficients.
12 Table 1 gives the standardized 
corruption indices for each country for the year 2005.  As might be expected, the indices 
are highly correlated with pairwise correlation coefficients that range from 0.66 to 0.90.   
4.    Cash holdings and the likelihood of political extraction 
4.1.    Overview   
We use Tobit regressions to test our hypothesis.  Tables 2 and 3 present our 
primary results.  In table 2, the firm is the unit of analysis.  In table 3, the firm-level data 
                                                 
11 If this variable is available in Djankov et al. (2007) or Levine et al. (2000), we use that 
estimate; if not we calculate the variable, using IMF data, as the ratio of credit from 
deposit taking financial institutions to the private sector relative to GDP.  
12 Legal origin is a binary variable and, therefore, it is not standardized. 
11 are aggregated for each country so that the country is the unit of observation.  For each 
regression, the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and, for those in table 
2, the standard errors are also corrected for the clustering of firms within 3-digit SIC 
industries in each country.  In each regression, the dependent variable is the ratio of cash 
to total assets.  The coefficients reported in the tables are the marginal effects, evaluated 
at the means, for the unconditional expected value of the dependent variable. 
4.2. Firm-level  regressions 
To begin, we focus on the firm-level regressions in table 2.  The regressions in 
panel A include only the corruption indices as independent variables.  As we move across 
the table, we move from the index that is available for the most countries to the index that 
is available for the fewest.  The sign of the coefficient of each of the corruption indices is 
negative and statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.001.  These results are 
consistent with our prediction that firms structure their asset holdings so as to shelter 
liquid assets from political extraction.   
The regressions in panel B parallel those in panel A, except that we now include 
the variables described above to control for the trade-off theory of cash holdings.   
Because we do not have observations on the control variables for every firm or every 
country, as we move from panel A to panel B, the number of firms and the number of 
countries in the regressions declines.  For example, in the first regression, the number of 
firms declines from 30,067 (in Panel A) to 17,291 (in Panel B) and the number of 
countries declines from 109 to 80.   
Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient of each of the corruption indices is 
negative and statistically significant with p-values less than 0.001.  To put the 
12 coefficients of the indices into economic perspective, based on the multiple regressions, 
and depending upon the corruption index used, a one standard deviation increase in the 
corruption index corresponds to a decline in the ratio of cash to total assets that ranges 
from 7.0% to 11.1%.  Thus, assuming that the trade-off theory and its empirical proxies 
reasonably control for operational factors that influence corporate cash holdings, the 
likelihood of political extraction is not only statistically, but also economically, 
significant in explaining corporate holdings of liquid assets.  The results are consistent 
with our prediction that owners structure their firm’s asset holdings so as to shelter assets 
from political extraction.   
4.3.    Country-level regressions 
We now turn to the country-level regressions in table 3.  The regressions in table 
3 parallel those in table 2 except that the firm-level data are aggregated across all firms in 
each country so that we have one observation per country.  This observation is the 
average of each variable across all firms in a given country.  We estimate the country-
level regressions because the number of firms is not constant across countries such that 
the estimated coefficients could be largely determined by a few countries with the largest 
number of firms.  The downside of this approach is that the power of the tests is reduced 
due to the smaller number of observations. 
  As shown in panel A of table 3, the coefficient of each of the corruption indices is 
negative and highly significant with a p-value of 0.002 or less.  As in table 2, when the 
control variables are included (panel B), the coefficient of each of the corruption indices 
continues to be negative with p-values of 0.02 or less.  Interestingly, the implied 
economic significance of the likelihood of political extraction in the country level 
13 regressions is larger than in the firm level regressions.  Depending upon the index 
employed, in the country level regressions, a one standard deviation increase in the index 
corresponds to a decline in the ratio of cash to total assets that ranges from 10.6% to 
19.5%.   
5.    Investments in hard assets and dividend payouts 
In sum, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms and their owners 
respond to the risk of political extraction by sheltering their assets more in countries in 
which that risk is higher.  More specifically, our tests show that firms hold less cash as a 
fraction of total assets in countries in which the threat of political extraction is higher.  
Those results give rise to the question of - - what happens to the cash?  Holding aside 
accounting manipulations, logically, the cash is either invested in hard assets or paid out 
to shareholders.  (We address the topic of accounting manipulations in Section 6.1.) 
If the mechanism for sheltering cash is to invest in hard assets or to return capital 
to shareholders, we would expect to see an increase in investments in property, plant, 
equipment, and inventory plus dividends as the likelihood of political extraction 
increases.  Henceforth, we use “investments” as shorthand for the sum of annual 
investment in property, plant, equipment, and inventory plus dividends.  (We use this 
shorthand, in part, because many firms do not pay dividends and, in those firms that do 
pay dividends, dividends comprise a small fraction of the total “investments”.) 
To examine this possibility, we estimate firm-level OLS regressions in which the 
dependent variable is the ratio of investments to sales against the corruption indices along 
with the control variables used in the regressions above.  The dependent variable is 
14 calculated as investment during 2006 divided by sales during 2006.  The independent 
variables are from 2005. 
The results are presented in table 4.  The coefficient of each of the corruption 
indices is positive with a p-value of less than 0.001.  These results indicate that firms in 
countries with a higher threat of political extraction invest relatively more in property, 
plant, equipment and inventory and/or pay out more to shareholders than do firms in 
countries with a lower threat of political extraction.  Note, of course, that this does not 
mean that firms invest more in more corrupt countries.  It only means that, given that a 
firm is established in a more corrupt country, the firm will invest relatively more in hard 
assets than if the firm were established in a less corrupt country.  Thus, the answer to the 
question posed at the outset of this section as to where the cash goes is that, at least in 
part, it is used to make investments in assets that are harder to extract or paid out to 
shareholders.  This result is consistent with our prediction that firms and their owners 
structure assets to shelter them from political extraction. 
6. Robustness  tests 
6.  1.  Off-balance sheet cash 
Our analysis presumes that the financial statements of firms are reliable.  That 
would seem to be a reasonable presumption, at least on average, given that all of the 
firms in the sample are publicly traded and have audited financial statements.  Thus, the 
ability of the firms to “hide” cash is limited.  Our analysis further presumes that, if firms 
have subsidiaries, the subsidiaries’ financial statements are consolidated with those of the 
parent.  In some instances, however, parent firms have unconsolidated subsidiaries.   
15 In those instances, parent firms may be able to shelter cash by holding the cash in 
their subsidiaries.  If so, we would predict that firms with unconsolidated subsidiaries 
would hold less cash on their own balance sheets than otherwise similar firms that do not 
have unconsolidated subsidiaries.  To test this prediction, we re-estimate the regressions 
of table 2, but add an indicator variable, “Subsidiary,” to denote whether a firm has at 
least one unconsolidated subsidiary.  This variable is from Orbis. 
The first column of table 5 reports the results of a representative regression using 
KKM Corruption as our measure of the likelihood of political extraction.  The coefficient 
of the indicator for unconsolidated subsidiaries is negative with a p-value of less than 
0.02.  Not shown in the table are the regressions with the other corruption indices.  In 
each of these, the coefficient of the indicator for unconsolidated subsidiaries is also 
negative with a p-value of 0.29 or less.  Thus, parent firms with unconsolidated 
subsidiaries tend to hold less cash on their balance sheets than otherwise similar firms 
that do not have unconsolidated subsidiaries.  More importantly, as in the regression 
shown in the first column of table 6, in each of the regressions, the coefficient of the 
corruption index is negative with a p-value of less than 0.001.  These results are 
consistent with the proposition that parent companies park, at least some, cash in their 
unconsolidated subsidiaries to shelter it from extraction by politicians and bureaucrats.  
However, even after controlling for that fact, firms hold less cash in more corrupt 
countries. 
A related possibility is that controlling shareholders shelter liquid assets from 
political extraction by hoarding cash in unlisted firms that they also control.  To consider 
this possibility, we construct an indicator variable, “Business group,” that denotes 
16 whether a given firm is controlled by a shareholder who controls another unlisted 
company.  To construct this variable, as in Claessens et al.  (2000), we trace the 
ownership of each public and private firm in Orbis to its largest ultimate shareholder.  
For each listed firm for which the ultimate shareholder controls at least 20% (10%) of the 
shares, we search to determine whether that shareholder controls at least 20% (10%) of 
the shares of an unlisted firm.   
We then re-estimate the regressions of table 2 including the indicator variable, 
Business group.  The results of representative regressions using KKM Corruption are 
given in the second and third columns of table 5.  The coefficients of Business group are 
not significantly different from zero (p-values = 0.23 and 0.87).  In both regressions (and 
in the regressions not shown in the table) the coefficients of the corruption indices are 
negative with p-values less than 0.001.  To the extent that our variable captures the 
interconnectedness of business groups, the results suggest that owners do not hoard cash 
in their unlisted firms as a way of sheltering liquid assets from political extraction. 
6.2. Other  years 
Our results are based on cross-sectional regressions with data for the year 2005.  
The virtue of 2005 data relative to the other years for which we have data is a larger 
number of observations.  Nevertheless, we also estimate each of the regressions in tables 
2 and 3 with data for the years 2002-2004 and for 2006.   
For illustrative purposes, the results for the firm-level regressions using KKM 
Corruption as the measure of the likelihood of political extraction are reported in table 6.  
Consistent with tables 2 and 3, the coefficient of KKM Corruption is negative for each 
year with a p-value of less than 0.001.  The regressions were also estimated using the 
17 other three corruption indices and using country-level data.  In each case, the coefficient 
of the corruption index is negative with 21 of the 28 p-values less than 0.05.  Thus, the 
negative correlation between corporate cash holdings and the likelihood of political 
extraction is not unique to 2005.   
6.3. Reverse  causality 
  A concern that can arise in cross sectional analysis of the type conducted herein is 
that of reverse causality in which the apparent dependent variable is actually “causing” 
the independent variable to occur.  That possibility seems to be remote in the question 
explored here in that it seems highly unlikely that low levels of corporate cash holdings 
would induce greater political corruption.   
  A related possibility is that both the relatively lower levels of cash and the higher 
levels of our corruption indices are due to a third unobserved factor.  If so, our key 
empirical result is spurious.  This possibility is common to most empirical studies in 
economics.  Our hope is that our inclusion of the known empirical determinants of 
corporate cash holdings in our models has reduced the likelihood of this possibility. 
6.4.  Ordinary least squares regressions  
A further concern with our analysis could be that the negative correlation between 
cash holdings and the corruption indices is the spurious result of an underlying 
correlation between industries and cash holdings.  One way to alleviate that concern is to 
include industry indicators.  However, as with other nonlinear models, inclusion of a 
large number of fixed effects in Tobit regressions gives rise to inconsistent estimates of 
the regression coefficients.  Therefore, we re-estimate each of the specifications in tables 
2 and 3 using OLS regressions and include three-digit SIC indicators.  Consistent with 
18 tables 2 and 3, the coefficients of the corruption indices (not shown in a table) are always 
negative.  In the firm-level regressions, the p-values are always less than 0.01 and in the 
country-level regressions they are always less than 0.05.   
6.5.  Asset bubbles and cheap credit 
  Some economists have argued that the 2000s were years of “asset bubbles” 
resulting, at least in part, from the availability of “cheap credit” and that this phenomenon 
was especially evident in the U.S.  and the U.K.  If so, it is possible that, during the 
period of 2002–2006, firms in the U.S.  and U.K.  built up cash holdings for reasons 
having nothing to do with corruption or the lack thereof, but rather having to do with the 
availability of cheap debt.  If that were the case, the negative relation between corporate 
cash holdings and our measures of corruption would be capturing the availability of 
cheap credit rather than the propensity of firms in corrupt countries to shelter assets. 
  To investigate whether our results are due to such a chain of causation, we omit 
the U.S.  and the U.K.  from our sample and re-estimate the regressions of tables 2 and 3.  
The coefficients of each of the corruption variables (not shown in a table) continue to be 
negative with p-values less than 0.02.  A thorough consideration of this question would 
require data outside of the period 2002-2006 - - data that we do not have.  As more time 
series data become available, that question will become amenable to investigation.   
6.6  The entry decision 
  We take as given the industries in which firms operate.  However, entrepreneurs 
have a choice over which industries to enter.  An alternative argument to ours is that 
entrepreneurs in more corrupt countries choose to enter industries that require fewer 
liquid assets.  Under this argument, the documented negative correlation between 
19 corporate cash holdings and our corruption indices is due to industry choice by 
entrepreneurs rather than by the decision to shelter assets from political extraction.  To 
test this proposition, we identify the most "cash-intensive” industries in the countries with 
the lowest KKM Corruption.  Specifically, we identify the 10% of industries with the 
highest ratio of cash to total assets in the 12 countries with the lowest KKM Corruption.   
  For each country in our sample, we compute the fraction of firms in the cash-
intensive industries relative to the population of publicly traded firms in that country.  We 
then calculate the correlation between KKM Corruption and the fraction of firms in the 
cash-intensive industries.  This coefficient is -0.04 with a p-value of 0.70.  This result 
suggests that industry choice is not a major determinant of the negative relation between 
cash holdings and corruption that we find. 
7.    Conclusion 
  It is frequently asserted in international management and economics texts that 
multinational firms base their asset locations, in part, on the relative risks of state 
expropriation of corporate assets with the proviso that the location of certain types of 
assets may be easier to control than others.  Consider the following: 
The natural location of different stages of production may be resource-
oriented, footloose, or market-oriented.  Oil, for instance, is drilled in and 
around the Persian Gulf, Venezuela, and Indonesia.  No choice exists for 
where this activity takes place.  Refining is footloose; a refining facility 
can easily be moved to another location or country.  Whenever possible, 
oil companies have built refineries in politically safe countries…
13  
 
Building upon Stulz (2005), we argue that the same principles apply within countries 
except that owners will exercise control over the type of assets in which to invest based 
upon the likelihood of political extraction of their firms’ assets.  In particular, given that 
                                                 
13 Eiteman, Stonehill and Moffett (2001), pp. 399-400.  
20 liquid assets are easier to extract than are hard assets such as property, plant, equipment 
and inventory, we hypothesize that owners hold a lower fraction of their firms’ assets in 
cash in countries where the likelihood of political extraction is higher.   
  We test this hypothesis with data on publicly traded firms from 109 countries.  To 
conduct the tests, we estimate regressions using the ratio of cash to total assets as the 
dependent variable and alternatively using four different measures of the likelihood of 
political extraction (which we label the corruption variables) as the key independent 
variable along with control variables found to be significant in explaining corporate cash 
holdings in prior studies.  Consistent with our prediction, in each of the regressions, the 
coefficient of the corruption variable is negative and statistically significant.   
We also address the question of - - where does the cash go? We show that firms 
located in countries where the likelihood of political extraction is higher invest more in 
harder to extract assets and/or pay higher dividends.  This result indicates that cash 
holdings are lower because firms and their owners have made a deliberate choice to alter 
the structure of their asset holdings in the face of the potential for political extraction.  To 
the extent that this choice pushes firms away from an optimal use of resources, the 
implication is that firms end up operating relatively less efficiently than they would have 
in the absence of this risk.  This observation connects our study to earlier research 
showing that political corruption is associated with lower rates of national economic 
growth.  In particular, one channel through which political corruption may lead to lower 
rates of economic growth is by inducing firms to structure their assets differently than 
they would have and that the alternative structure retards economic development.  
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
This table gives descriptive statistics as of 2005, by country, for all non-financial publicly traded companies with cash, marketable securities, and total assets data available 
in Orbis from countries for which at least one corruption variable is available.  Cash/Total assets is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets.  The four 
corruption variables are KKM Corruption, ICRG Corruption, ICRG Investment profile, and Neumann Corruption.  KKM Corruption measures “…the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain…” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007).  ICRG Corruption is “…an assessment of corruption within the political system.” 
ICRG Investment profile is “…an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment” (International Country Risk Guide compiled by the Political Risk Services Group).  
Neumann Corruption, developed by Neumann (1994), measures the frequency with which side payments to government officials are expected in order to do business in a 
given country.  Higher values of the corruption variables denote a greater likelihood of political extraction.  The corruption variables are standardized so to have a mean of 
































Anguilla 1  0.082  -0.831        Lithuania 40  0.066  0.162  0.211  -0.562  -1.257 
Argentina 83  0.077  0.779  0.211  1.430  0.504    Luxembourg 24  0.191  -1.400  -1.711  -1.009  -1.257 
Australia 1,349  0.276  -1.525 -1.711 -1.009 -1.257    Macedonia   2  0.018  0.789      1.091 
Austria 67  0.133  -1.545  -1.711  -1.009  -1.257    Malaysia 867  0.125  0.133  0.275  0.331  -0.083 
Bahamas 2  0.02  -0.899  -0.942  -0.786      Malta 4  0.062  -0.629  -0.558  -0.786   
Bahrain 15  0.178  -0.243  0.595  -0.786      Marshall Islands  6  0.064  0.798       
Bangladesh 2  0.037  1.560  0.980  1.243  1.678    Mauritius 10  0.069  0.066       
Barbados 3  0.101  -0.793          Mexico 107  0.089  0.760  0.595  -0.488  0.504 
Belgium 144  0.159  -1.034  -0.942  -0.786  -1.257    Morocco 38  0.084  0.480  0.211  0.331  1.091 
Belize 1  0.083  0.605          Mozambique 1  0.064  0.962  0.980  0.555   
Bermuda 502  0.218  -0.831          Namibia 1  0.164  0.326  0.980  -0.116  -0.670 
Bolivia 12  0.062  1.145  0.595  1.374  1.091    Netherlands 177  0.127  -1.545  -1.711  -1.009  -1.257 
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina  1 0.012  0.615       
 Netherlands   
Antilles  4 0.239  -0.831       
Botswana 8  0.223  -0.686  -0.173  -0.786      New Zealand  106  0.135  -1.795 -2.096 -1.009 -1.257 
Brazil 312  0.087  0.654  0.724  1.001  1.091    Nicaragua 3  0.035  0.972  0.211  0.480   
Bulgaria 134  0.049  0.384  0.595  -0.786  -0.083    Nigeria 13  0.104  1.560  1.108  2.174  1.678 
Canada 987  0.231  -1.477  -1.743 -1.009 -1.257    Norway 308  0.205  -1.602  -1.711  -0.786  -1.257 
Cayman Islands  369  0.288  -0.831          Oman 92  0.09  -0.291  0.211  -0.786   
Chile 164  0.065  -0.928  -1.327  -0.786  -0.670    Pakistan 155  0.081  1.367  0.980  2.118  1.678 
China 1,386  0.15  1.030  0.595  1.132  1.091    Panama 6  0.057  0.634  0.595  -0.116   
Colombia 56  0.09  0.586  -0.173  0.480  1.091    Papua New Guinea  6  0.111 1.454  1.364  0.964   
Costa Rica  9  0.081  -0.002  0.467  0.555  -0.083    Paraguay 3  0.035  1.560  1.364  0.555  1.091 
Croatia 211  0.021  0.278  0.211  0.108  -0.083    Peru 115  0.069  0.846  0.211  0.778  0.504 
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Cyprus 2  0.189  -0.301  -0.942  -1.009      Philippines 146  0.13  0.943  0.595  0.220  1.678 
Czech Republic  69  0.124  -0.031  0.211  -0.786  -0.083    Poland 193  0.100  0.210  0.499  -0.786  -0.083 
Denmark 139  0.183  -1.786  -2.096  -0.786  -1.257    Portugal 70  0.062  -0.735  -0.942  -1.009  -1.257 
Ecuador 21  0.118  1.145  -0.173  1.895  -0.083    Qatar 16  0.218  -0.417  0.211  -0.116   
Egypt 471  0.119  0.798  0.980  1.448  1.091    Romania 61  0.052  0.605  0.211  0.331  0.504 
El Salvador  4  0.116  0.712  0.211  0.778      Russian Federation  678  0.044 1.126  0.595  0.331  1.091 
Estonia 18  0.108  -0.474  -0.173  -0.116  -0.670    Saudi Arabia  67  0.131  0.143 0.595 -0.562  1.091 
Finland 135  0.151  -1.950  -2.480  -1.009  -1.257    Singapore 537  0.187  -1.795  -1.327  -1.009  -1.257 
France 799  0.155  -0.976  -0.558  -1.009  -1.257    Slovakia 134  0.086  -0.041  0.211  -0.730  -0.083 
Gabon 1  0.092  1.010  1.364  0.741  0.504    Slovenia 7  0.053  -0.436  -0.173  -0.562  -0.670 
Germany 678  0.170  -1.477  -1.359  -1.009  -1.257    South Africa  194  0.148  -0.166  0.467  -0.562  -1.257 
Greece 251  0.063  -0.012  0.083  -0.264  0.504    Spain 183  0.124  -0.918  -0.942  -1.009  0.504 
Guatemala 2  0.069  1.155  0.980  -0.116      Sri Lanka  67  0.075  0.663  0.211  1.039   
Hong Kong  116  0.19  -1.255  -0.942  -1.009  -1.257    Sudan 1  0.147  1.714  1.364  1.001   
Hungary 29  0.083  -0.204  -0.173  -0.823  0.504    Sweden 446  0.193  -1.651  -1.711  -1.009  -1.257 
Iceland 29  0.052  -2.036  -2.096  -0.562      Switzerland 180  0.162  -1.680  -1.327  -0.991  -1.257 
India 1,237  0.077  0.692  0.211  0.182  1.091    Taiwan 1,381  0.155  -0.243  -0.173  -0.786  0.504 
Indonesia 239  0.092  1.213  1.364  1.337  1.678    Thailand 377  0.098  0.586  0.980  0.555  1.678 
Ireland 71  0.240  -1.255  -0.686  -1.009  -1.257    Trinidad and Tobago  7  0.096  0.355  0.595  -0.786   
Israel 133  0.312  -0.368  -0.173  -0.116  -0.670    Tunisia 20  0.09  0.345  0.595  0.592  -0.083 
Italy 251  0.114  -0.021  0.211  -1.009  0.504    Turkey 55  0.115  0.422  0.211  0.778  -0.083 
Jamaica 21  0.146  0.827  0.980  0.313      Ukraine 25  0.058  0.972  0.820  0.908  -0.083 
Japan 3,654  0.176  -0.831  -0.558 -0.786 -1.257    United Arab Emirates  36  0.24  -0.706  0.595  -0.786  1.091 
Jordan 104  0.102  0.056  -0.173  -0.041  -0.083    United Kingdom  1,937  0.214  -1.496 -1.327 -1.009  -1.257 
Kazakhstan 1  0.022  1.280  0.980  0.704  -0.083    USA 5,181  0.24  -1.140  -1.711  -0.860  -1.257 
Kenya 8  0.147  1.338  1.396  0.108  0.504    Uruguay 2  0.011  -0.417  -0.173  0.071  -0.083 
Korea (Rep.)  1,465  0.104  -0.079  0.211  -0.153  0.504    Venezuela 22  0.129  1.348  0.980  2.733  1.091 
Kuwait 32  0.255  -0.426  0.211  -0.786  0.504    Vietnam 102  0.111  1.107  0.980  0.555   
Latvia 34  0.102  0.017  0.595  -0.562  -0.083    Virgin Islands  14  0.334  -0.378       
Lebanon 1  0.079  0.740  1.364  0.480      Zambia 2  0.062  1.155  -0.173  1.430  1.091 
Liberia 2  0.115  1.454  0.595  2.118  1.091    Zimbabwe 2  0.168  1.608  2.133  3.682  0.504 
Liechtenstein 1  0.281  -0.831                      Table 2. Cash holdings and the potential for political extraction: Firm-level regression results 
with 2005 data. 
This table presents Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio of cash to total assets.  The firm is 
the unit of observation.  All variables other than Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets 
are trimmed at the top/bottom 1%.  For Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets 
observations below 0 or above 1 are excluded.  Higher values of KKM Corruption, ICRG Corruption, ICRG 
Investment profile, and Neumann Corruption denote a greater likelihood of political extraction.  Continuous 
independent variables are standardized.  P-values, reported in parentheses below the coefficients, are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country/industry level.   
Panel A 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
KKM Corruption   -0.039       
 (0.000)       
ICRG  Corruption   -0.042    
   (0.000)     
ICRG Investment profile      -0.031   
     (0.000)   
Neumann Corruption        -0.037 
       (0.000) 
Intercept  0.139 0.139 0.136 0.138 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations  30,067  29,153  29,153  28,766 
Number of countries  109  97  97  78 
Prob>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Panel B 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
KKM Corruption  -0.013       
 (0.000)       
ICRG  Corruption   -0.019    
   (0.000)     
ICRG Investment profile      -0.012   
     (0.000)   
Neumann Corruption        -0.015 
       (0.000) 
Sales  growth  0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt/Total  assets  -0.036 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow/Total assets  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.003 
  (0.801) (0.754) (0.815) (0.788) 
Delta NWC/Total assets  -0.402  -0.400  -0.402  -0.401 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investments/Total  assets  -0.070 -0.069 -0.069 -0.070 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln (Total assets)  -0.014  -0.015  -0.015  -0.016 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership  concentration  -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UK legal origin  0.013  0.006  0.015  0.012 
  (0.086) (0.350) (0.034) (0.081) 
Private  credit/GDP  0.016 0.013 0.018 0.014 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept  0.129 0.134 0.128 0.131 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations  17,291  17,290  17,290  17,172 
Number of countries  80  79  79  69 
Prob>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
28 Table 3. Cash holdings and the potential for political extraction: Country-level regression results 
with 2005 data. 
This table presents Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio of cash to total assets.  Firm-level 
data are averaged for each country so that the country average is the unit of observation.  All variables other than 
Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets are trimmed at the top/bottom 1%.  For 
Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets observations below 0 or above 1 are excluded.  
Higher values of KKM Corruption, ICRG Corruption, ICRG Investment profile, and Neumann Corruption denote a 
greater likelihood of political extraction.  Continuous independent variables are standardized.  P-values, reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients, are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity.   
Panel A 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
KKM Corruption  -0.034       
 (0.000)       
ICRG Corruption    -0.022     
   (0.000)     
ICRG Investment profile      -0.020   
     (0.002)   
Neumann Corruption        -0.029 
       (0.000) 
Intercept 0.118  0.116  0.116  0.119 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Number of observations  109  97  97  78 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000  0.003  0.000 
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Panel B 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
KKM Corruption  -0.024       
 (0.000)       
ICRG  Corruption   -0.015    
   (0.003)     
ICRG Investment profile      -0.013   
     (0.019)   
Neumann Corruption        -0.018 
       (0.000) 
Sales  growth  0.013 0.011 0.014 0.016 
  (0.092) (0.182) (0.081) (0.048) 
Debt/Total  assets  -0.023 -0.023 -0.019 -0.021 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Cash flow/Total assets  0.002  -0.001  -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.812) (0.945) (0.484) (0.523) 
Delta NWC/Total assets  0.002  0.008  0.010  0.003 
  (0.670) (0.361) (0.226) (0.881) 
Investments/Total  assets  -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 
  (0.020) (0.103) (0.275) (0.769) 
Ln (Total assets)  0.015  0.014  0.017  0.016 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Ownership  concentration  -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 
  (0.474) (0.491) (0.709) (0.146) 
UK legal origin  0.034  0.035  0.032  0.031 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.031) 
Private  credit/GDP  0.005 0.011 0.013 0.010 
  (0.343) (0.040) (0.021) (0.053) 
Intercept  0.109 0.109 0.109 0.110 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations  83  81  81  69 
Prob>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
30 Table 4. Investments and the potential for political extraction: Firm-level regression results with 
2005 data. 
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio of (Net capital 
expenditures + Change in inventory + Dividends)t+1/ Salest+1. The firm is the unit of observation.  All variables other 
than Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets are trimmed at the top/bottom 1%.  For 
Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets, observations below 0 or above 1 are excluded.  
All regressions include 3-digit SIC industry indicators.  Higher values of KKM Corruption, ICRG Corruption, ICRG 
Investment profile, and Neumann Corruption denote a greater likelihood of political extraction.  Coefficients are 
standardized.  P-values, reported in parentheses below the coefficients, are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country/industry level.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
KKM Corruption  0.069       
 (0.000)       
ICRG Corruption    0.080     
   (0.000)     
ICRG Investment profile      0.073   
     (0.000)   
Neumann Corruption        0.076 
       (0.000) 
Sales  growth  -0.051 -0.049 -0.052 -0.051 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Debt/Total assets  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  0.004 
  (0.858) (0.954) (0.913) (0.803) 
Cash flow/Total assets  0.578  0.575  0.577  0.576 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Delta NWC/Total assets  -0.843  -0.857  -0.819  -0.912 
  (0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.015) 
Ln (Total assets)  0.078  0.082  0.080  0.077 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership  concentration  0.023 0.024 0.019 0.025 
  (0.051) (0.039) (0.095) (0.036) 
UK legal origin  -0.072  -0.057  -0.077  -0.070 
  (0.008) (0.026) (0.003) (0.009) 
Private  credit/GDP  0.036 0.049 0.026 0.045 
  (0.017) (0.003) (0.066) (0.005) 
Intercept  -0.045 -0.058 -0.044 -0.053 
    (0.046) (0.011) (0.049) (0.020) 
Number of observations  11,933  11,932  11,932  11,837 
Number of countries  71  70  70  63 
R-squared  (Adjusted)  17.72% 17.77% 17.78% 17.90% 
 
31  Table 5. Cash holdings and the potential for political extraction: Off-balance sheet cash. 
This table presents Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio of cash to total assets.  The firm is 
the unit of observation.  All variables other than Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets 
are trimmed at the top/bottom 1%.  For Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets 
observations below 0 or above 1 are excluded.  Higher values of KKM Corruption, ICRG Corruption, ICRG 
Investment profile, and Neumann Corruption denote a greater likelihood of political extraction.  Continuous 
independent variables are standardized.  P-values, reported in parentheses below the coefficients, are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country/industry level.   
(1) (2) (3) 
Unconsolidated subsidiaries  -0.012     
 (0.018)     
Business group (20%)    -0.004   
   (0.232)   
Business group (10%)      0.001 
     (0.870) 
KKM corruption  -0.013  -0.013  -0.013 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sales growth  0.006  0.007  0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Debt/Total assets  -0.033  -0.036  -0.036 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cash flow/Total assets  0.006  0.003  0.003 
 (0.609)  (0.803)  (0.801) 
Delta NWC/Total assets  -0.409  -0.402  -0.402 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Investments/Total assets  -0.068  -0.070  -0.070 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln (Total assets)  -0.014  -0.014  -0.015 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ownership concentration  -0.008  -0.007  -0.008 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
UK legal origin  0.009  0.012  0.013 
 (0.124)  (0.093)  (0.085) 
Private credit/GDP  0.012  0.015  0.016 
 (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Intercept 0.128  0.130  0.129 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Number of observations  12,458  17,291  17,291 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table 6. Cash holdings and the potential for political extraction: Firm-level regression results 
with 2002-04 and 2006 data. 
This table presents Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio of cash to total assets.  The firm is 
the unit of observation.  Variables are measured as of the end of 2006 in regression 1; as of the end of 2004 in 
regression 2; as of the end of 2003 in regression 3; and as of 2002 in regression 4.  All variables other than 
Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets are trimmed at the top/bottom 1%.  For 
Ownership concentration, Cash/Total assets and Debt/Total assets observations below 0 or above 1 are excluded.  
Higher values of KKM Corruption denote a greater likelihood of political extraction.  Continuous independent 
variables are standardized.  P-values, reported in parentheses below the coefficients, are based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country/industry level.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year: 2006 2004 2003 2002 
KKM  Corruption  -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales  growth  0.009 0.009 0.007 0.004 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) 
Debt/Total  assets  -0.035 -0.035 -0.039 -0.045 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow/Total assets  0.024  0.017  0.012  -0.028 
  (0.008) (0.141) (0.124) (0.000) 
Delta NWC/Total assets  -0.227  -0.034  -0.179  -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.983) 
Investments/Total  assets  -0.082 -0.061 -0.402 -0.004 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.581) 
Ln (Total assets)  -0.015  -0.011  -0.010  -0.008 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership  concentration  -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UK legal origin  0.011  0.008  0.009  0.008 
  (0.162) (0.277) (0.220) (0.283) 
Private  credit/GDP  0.016 0.019 0.020 0.020 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept  0.129 0.124 0.121 0.114 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations  12,923  16,337  15,367  14,043 
Number of countries  73  85  85  84 
Prob>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 